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PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT: 1984-1985
Stephen J. Werber*
The Sixth Circuit, as other federal courts, is deciding a growing number
of product liability cases. The court has been required to carefully
explore state substantive law in such complex areas as comparative fault
and foreseeability. Several of the recent cases have required application
of difficult facts to recognized legal principles. In the following article
Professor Werber analyzes key decisions against applicable state law and
suggests areas in which the court has applied that law in manners both
consistent with, and contrary to, state law. Professor Werber is critical of
the court's Erie determination that the Ohio Supreme Court would not
adopt comparative principles in strict liability actions. Nevertheless, he
concludes that the court is performing fairly and that its judgments are
generally consistent with those that would be reached by state courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
W HERE potential diversity exists, counsel for plaintiffs in a
product liability action must carefully consider the advisabil-
ity of filing in federal district court instead of state court. Defense
counsel, in certain situations, must consider the possible benefit of
removal to the federal court.' The usual litany of elements or factors
to consider includes the quality of the bench and the potential jury
pool, the general predilections of judges in a given court, pre-trial
procedures including conferences with the court and discovery rules,
calendar congestion and the likelihood of delays before trial, and
geographic convenience. The decision is sometimes deferred by
counsel who file identical actions in both courts and attempt to
proceed before the judge with the action in the court most likely to
favor plaintiff. This procedure raises questions of ethics and of law.2
*Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law. B.A., Adelphi University, 1961; J.D., Cornell University, 1964; LL.M., New
York University, 1970. Of Counsel, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley,
Cleveland, Ohio.
1. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441, 1446 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).
2. In Howard v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc. No. C83-4994-A (N.D. Ohio order,
June 19, 1985), Judge Bell dismissed the federal action on the grounds that the
identical action was pending in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas. See also Moses H.
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Certain factors which should be weighed in making the determi-
nation are sometimes ignored. These factors include (1) the manner
in which the federal court will interpret and apply the required state
substantive law, and (2) analysis of the record on appeal in terms of
any indicia of outcome which tends to favor a particular side.
Interpretation of state law is often difficult. In the still developing
area of product liability law, the federal court is often required to
exercise considerable wisdom in interpretation of applicable law. At
other times the court may face the onerous, yet challenging, duty of
predicting state law where no specific precedent can be found.3
A review of the decisions of the Sixth Circuit in product liability
cases decided from January 1, 1984, through August 30, 1985, is
revealing. In this time span the Sixth Circuit issued twelve reported
decisions 4 and at least two slip opinions, Stearns v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.5 and Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., Inc.,6 which concern the
product field. These decisions are not quantitatively adequate as a
basis for statistical predictions. However, a statistical analysis of a
limited nature suggests that all parties have been treated quite
fairly by the Sixth Circuit. The decisions exhibit considerable effort
to properly apply existing law while exercising caution and re-
straint in those cases demanding an Erie prediction of future state
law.
In most of the decisions the court correctly determined applicable
law, the roles of procedure and review, and made a proper applica-
tion of the facts to reach its decision. Regrettably, some of the
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Crawley v.
Hamilton County Comm'rs, 744 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1984). Ethical considerations are
beyond the scope of this article.
3. Consistent with the mandates of the Erie doctrine. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1934).
4. Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985); Leonard v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 765 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Hardware Wholesalers, Inc.,
762 F.2d 46 (6th Cir. 1985); Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir.
1985); Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1984); Toth v.
Yoder Co., 749 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1984); Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., 738 F.2d 126
(6th Cir. 1984); Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 545 (1984); Miller v. Utica Mill Specialty Mach. Co., 731 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.
1984); Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc., 728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1984);
Wade v. Descent Control, 727 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984); Birchfield v. International
Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984).
5. 770 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985).
6. 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985).
528 [Vol. 17
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decisions seem to illustrate that either the court did not fully
comprehend the basis of the decision below or failed to properly
apply the law to the facts. 7
The substantive law applied covers each of the four states within
the Sixth Circuit. Six decisions invoked the law of Ohio, four the law
of Michigan, two the law of Kentucky, and two the law of Tennes-
see.8 In each, the law of the state in which the district court sat was
applied and no serious question of choice of law under Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.9 was raised.
Eleven district court decisions favored defendant manufactur-
ers.10 Eight of the district court decisions were affirmed including
7. Toth, 749 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1984); Birchfield, 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984).
See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
8. Ohio Law: Bailey, 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985); Stearns, 770 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.
1985); Minichello, 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985); Adams, 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984); Grover Hill Grain Co., 728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1984);
Birchfield, 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984).
Michigan Law: Rhea, 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985); Phillips, 762 F.2d 46 (6th Cir.
1985); Toth, 749 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1984); Wade, 727 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984).
Kentucky Law: Leonard, 765 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1985); Calhoun, 738 F.2d 126
(6th Cir. 1984).
Tennessee Law: Bright, 756 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1984); Miller, 731 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.
1984).
9. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
10.
District Court Sixth Circuit Prevailing
Case Judgment for Judgment Party
Bailey Defendant Reversed Plaintiff
Stearns Defendant Reversed Plaintiff
Rhea Plaintiff AffIrmed Plaintiff
Leonard Plaintiff Affirmed Plaintiff
Phillips Plaintiff Affirmed Plaintiff
Minichello Defendant Reversed Plaintiff
Bright Defendant Affirmed Defendant
Toth Defendant Reversed Plaintiff
Calhoun Defendant Affirmed Defendant
Adams Defendant Affirmed Defendant
Miller Defendant Affirmed Defendant
Grover Hill Grain Defendant Reversed Plaintiff
Wade Defendant Affirmed Defendant
Birchfteld Defendant Reversed Plaintiff
Note: The term "reversed" is used in the broad sense to include remands and does
not denote a judgment on the merits. The district court judgments included summary
judgment, directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., and judgments entered on jury verdicts.
Spring 1986] 529
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five which favored the defendant manufacturer." After the Sixth
Circuit decisions, a total of nine cases favored plaintiffs and five
favored defendants. 12 The three district court opinions favoring
plaintiffs were affirmed. 13 Of the eleven decisions initially favoring
defendants, six were reversed.14 Plaintiffs' verdicts were upheld in
one hundred per cent of the cases, whereas defense verdicts were
upheld in forty-five per cent of the cases. In light of the general
trend toward liberalizing the law in favor of injured parties in
product litigation (e.g., easing a plaintiffs burden of proof) and the
social policies now entrenched in favor of loss allocation, it is
surprising and rewarding to find that defendants have prevailed
with this degree of regularity. At the same time, meritorious claims
put forth by plaintiffs have prevailed.
Of course, these percentages are based on limited data and do not
reflect the large number of cases in which there are no reported
decisions or in which no appeal had been perfected. The vast
majority of product cases continue to be resolved prior to or during
trial. Despite the limited sample size, it is evident that a manufac-
turer has a significant likelihood of a successful defense where his
product is not defective or did not cause the harm. The Sixth Circuit
has not made manufacturers the insurers of injured consumers and
shows no consistent inclination to do so. Despite the orientation of
the law, it appears that a fair trial can be had and that there is a
significant potential for affirmance of the district court judgment
regardless of the prevailing party below. (Eight of the fourteen
decisions, fifty-seven per cent, were affirmed.)
Counsel for both plaintiff and defendant would be well advised to
ascertain the pattern in the applicable state courts at both the trial
and appellate levels before deciding whether a federal action would
be in their client's best interest.
On a more substantive level, a wide variety of legal issues
were presented to the Sixth Circuit in 1984 and 1985.15 Of these,
11. See supra note 10.
12. See supra note 10.
13. See supra note 10.
14. See supra note 10.
15. The primary substantive legal areas, excluding procedural and evidentiary
issues, included:
Admissibility of Evidence: Minichello, 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985) (non-occurrence
of prior accidents); Bright, 756 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1984) (intoxication-causation,
negligence and strict liability); Calhoun, 738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984) (recall letter).
[Vol. 17
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the most interesting and revealing appear to be the decisions
involving Michigan's law relating to foreseeability and Ohio's
law relating to comparative fault. These four decisions are
discussed below. Many of the other decisions also merit com-
ment. For illustrative purposes relatively brief comment will be
directed to Birchfield v. International Harvester, Co.,16 Bright v.
Affirmative Defenses: Bailey, 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985) (comparative
negligence-strict liability; assumption of risk); Stearns, 770 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985)
(comparative negligence-strict liability); Minichello, 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985)
(assumption of risk); Wade, 727 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984) (comparative negligence,
misuse).
Alternative Design: Phillips, 762 F.2d 46 (6th Cir. 1985).
Dangerous Work Place-Duty of Care: Miller, 731 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1984).
Design Defect Elements-Burden of Proof-Manufacturer's Conduct: Rhea, 767
F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985) (negligence and breach of warranty); Phillips, 762 F.2d 46
(6th Cir. 1985) (breach of warranty); Calhoun, 738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984) (strict
liability); Birchfield, 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984) (strict liability, conduct).
Expert Witnesses-Need and Weight of Testimony: Calhoun, 738 F.2d 126 (6th
Cir. 1984) (weight); Grover Hill Grain Co., 728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1984) (need);
Birchfield, 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984) (Weick, J., dissenting) (weight). Failure to
Warn-Adequacy of Warning: Leonard, 765 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1985) (tire inflation);
Adams, 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.), (to reach employees), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545
(1984); Grover Hill Grain Co., 728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1984) (assembly requirements).
Foreseeable Risk or Use-Reasonable Care-Modification: Rhea, 767 F.2d 266 (6th
Cir. 1985); Adams, 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984); Toth,
749 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1984).
Industry or Government Standards: Bailey, 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985);
Minichello, 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985); Birchfield, 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Weick, J., dissenting).
Intervening Cause: Adams, 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.) (notice of danger), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 545 (1984); Grover Hill Grain Co., 728 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1984) (improper
assembly).
Obvious Danger: Leonard, 765 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1985); Miller, 731 F.2d 305 (6th
Cir. 1984).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 388 (1965) (dangerous chattel): Adams, 737 F.2d
1453 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
The court also addressed the continuing saga of liquidation of some 160 product
liability personal injury actions brought against White Motor Corp. The decision in
Citibank N.A. v. White Motor Corp., 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985) resolved the conflict
between 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(5) and § 1334(c)(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985) by ex-
ploring the history of the Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). The court concluded that the actions could
proceed in the separate courts. The statute was interpreted to permit abstention
despite an existing reorganization plan, which would usually trigger a statutory
injunction. The district court was reversed only as to questions concerning personal
injury actions with respect to which no claim was filed in the bankruptcy proceedings.
16. 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984).
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Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,17 and Calhoun v. Honda Motor
Co.
1 8
II. THE OHIO LAW-CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS
In both Stearns v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Bailey v. V &
0 Press Co. the court was faced with the task of deciding a
significant issue without benefit of appellate level or Supreme Court
precedent. The court did have the benefit of an extensive opinion by
Judge Thomas in the Stearns case.19 In a real sense the court was
forced to decide between the persuasive logic, reasoning, and policy
arguments set forth by Judge Thomas in support of his conclusion
that comparative fault principles would be applied to strict liability
actions under Ohio law, and the caution required before a federal
circuit court should decide a major substantive issue in a manner
extending existing case law. In these cases, the court was also faced
with a Comparative Negligence Act 2o which specifically approved
the concept of comparative negligence but was silent as to applica-
tion of such a principle in strict liability. The court took the position
that the specific limitations in the Comparative Fault Act precluded
extension of the principle.
In Stearns, the plaintiff, executrix of the Estate of Arthur J.
Stearns, ultimately proceeded solely on a theory of strict liability.
The gravaman of the complaint was that the plaintiffs decedent
contracted cancer by exposure to asbestos produced and marketed by
several defendants. The defendants asserted contributory negli-
gence and assumption of the risk as affirmative defenses. After the
filing of briefs, hearings were held which focused primarily on the
application of the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act as it bore on
comparative principles in a strict liability action and as it effected
joint and several liability. The district court ruled that a form of
common law comparative fault, consistent with the Act, was appli-
17. 756 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1984).
18. 738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984).
19. Stearns v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. C79-2088 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 17,
1984) (Memorandum and Order).
20. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981). Comparative Negligence applies
in negligence actions where the defense of contributory negligence is asserted.
[Vol. 17
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cable and that only several liability was allowed. The Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded on the comparative fault question:
Stearns challenges the district court's ruling that § 2315.19 applies to
her strict liability action. We agree and hold, consistent with our
decision and reasoning in Bailey. v. V & 0 Press Co., that the statute,
which on its face is limited to negligence actions, does not apply in
actions based on strict liability in tort.21
The court refrained from comment on the other primary issue
raised below, the abolition of joint and several liability, on the basis
of the non-applicability of the statute. In reaching its decision, the
court virtually ignored the major arguments and significant author-
ity relied on by the district court. The court failed to recognize that
the district court, as the Ohio Supreme Court in Wilfong v.
Batdorf,22 did not apply the statute. The district court applied
common law to reach its conclusion:
When the question of applying the statute to a strict liability in tort
claim comes before the Ohio Supreme Court, it is believed that the
Court will analyze the strict liability in tort defense of assumption of
risk as a 'form of contributory negligence' in keeping with section
402A's comment n,.... When these analyses are coupled by the Court
with the policy considerations which this court has suggested are
relevant, it is believed that the Supreme Court of Ohio, taking the next
logical step beyond Ceccardi but consistent with its holding, will merge
the strict liability in tort assumption of risk defense with 'contributory
negligence' under the comparative negligence statute. Hence, it is
concluded that under the common law of Ohio, the principle of compar-
ative negligence, consistent with R.C. § 2315.19, applies to this strict
liability in tort case .... 23
To a considerable extent, the substantive issue and Erie mandate
were addressed in Bailey. The court relied upon this decision as the
basis for reversing Stearns. The court correctly limited its substan-
tive and Erie analysis to one of the two cases. This is a common,
reasonable, and accepted judicial approach which provides effi-
21. Stearns, 770 F.2d 599, 601 (6th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
22. 6 Ohio St. 3d 100, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (1983).
23. Stearns, No. C79-2088 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 17, 1984) (Memorandum and Order,
at 18-20) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Spring 19861
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ciency. However, by selecting Bailey as the fulcrum decision, the
court was able to avoid a thorough analysis of the arguments put
forward by the district court in Stearns.
In Bailey, unlike Stearns, it was the plaintiff who sought appli-
cation of comparative negligence in a strict liability action. The
district court refused to give a jury instruction on comparative
negligence. A jury verdict was returned in favor of defendant
(though plaintiff may well have prevailed had comparative princi-
ples been applied). The Sixth Circuit concurred in the district court
refusal to apply comparative principles to this cause of action
although the district court was reversed on other grounds. 24
Plaintiff was injured while working on a seventy-one ton punch
press. He inadvertently activated the press by stepping on a foot
pedal when he turned in response to a call from someone across the
room. Defendant was the press manufacturer. The press, when
originally sold, did not have a point of operation safety guard and
did not have any warnings affixed to the press.25 Plaintiffs em-
ployer had installed a point of operation guard, but it was not in
place at the time of the accident due to the kind of work being
performed. 26 The defendant urged contributory negligence, assump-
tion of the risk, and intervening acts as affirmative defenses.
In reaching its decision on the comparative negligence issue, the
Sixth Circuit panel recognized its Erie-based obligation stating that:
If the highest court has not yet spoken, the federal court must ascertain
from all available data what the state law is and apply it ....
Since the Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed the issue subjudice,
24. The reversal was based upon the district court's failure to issue a limiting
instruction in regard to the admission of OSHA and ANSI standards. "While the
initial admission and use of this evidence may have been proper, the court's failure
to include a limiting instruction . . . on the strict liability claim permitted
unrestricted consideration of the testimony." Bailey, 770 F.2d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir.
1985) (footnotes omitted).
25. Failure to warn is not a basis for imposition of strict liability under Ohio law.
Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 706 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1983) and cases cited
therein; Hardiman v. Zep Manufacturing Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 222, 470 N.E.2d 941
(1984).
26. The court observed that the employer could not be sued because of the Ohio
Workman's Compensation Act. Bailey, 770 F.2d 601, 603 (6th Cir. 1985). Such an
action is now possible. See Jones v. VIP Development Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472
N.E.2d 1046 (1984) and Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., 69 Ohio St.
2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
[Vol. 17
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we must consider all relevant data to determine whether that court
would apply the principles of comparative negligence to strict liability
actions. 27
The decision of the court was inconsistent with this stated duty as
all available data was not considered despite a considerable effort to
do so. The court's caution and conservative approach, often appro-
priate in Erie analysis cases, went too far. The court failed to
recognize the importance of several cases relied upon by Judge
Thomas and failed to consider the logical progression exhibited by
the Ohio Supreme Court in its treatment of comparative negligence
principles and related defenses. The Erie approach taken was
correct, but the application of that approach, i.e., the analysis of
Ohio law and policy, was either incorrect or highly questionable.
Despite its flawed reasoning, the court's refusal to extend compar-
ative negligence to strict liability actions may ultimately be vali-
dated by the Ohio Supreme Court. Such a decision by the Ohio
Supreme Court would justify the Sixth Circuit conclusion. It would
not justify the reasoning which led to that conclusion.
Admittedly, the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act is limited to
negligence actions and comparative negligence applies only where
contributory negligence is asserted as a defense. This is the extent
of the Act. Nothing in the Act directly prohibits analogous com-
mon law development. The court recognized the possibility of an
extension of comparative negligence principles predicated on the
merger of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk as
announced in Anderson v. Ceccardi.2s The court also recognized that
commentators, as an example of sound policy, support the applica-
tion of comparative fault regardless of plaintiffs underlying legal
theory.29 Moreover, the court was aware that a majority of jurisdic-
27. Bailey, 770 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1985) (footnotes and citations omitted).
The court also observed that the Ohio Supreme Court had refrained from adopting
comparative negligence until adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act in Baab v.
Shockling, 61 Ohio St. 2d 55, 399 N.E.2d 87 (1980). Id. at n.1. However, the court did
not recognize the Ohio Supreme Court's willingness to provide retroactive effect to
the Act in Wilfong v. Batdorf, 6 Ohio St. 3d 100, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (1983), which limits
the persuasiveness of Baab.
28. 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).
29. For support, the court cited Kasten, Comparative Liability Principles: Should
They Now Apply to StrictProducts Liability Actions in Ohio?, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1151,
1185-98 (1983).
Spring 1986]
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tions had extended comparative principles to strict liability ac-
tions.30
Few any longer argue that there is any inherent difficulty, in logic
or policy, for rejecting comparison of a plaintiffs conduct with a
purported non-conduct based design defect. That strict liability does
not refer to "conduct" or "fault" is a legal fiction. Behind every
design defect there is a conscious or unconscious design decision
predicated on human participation. The "risk-benefit" definition of
defect is grounded in conduct and human decision-making pro-
cesses. Design defect and conduct (of the injured party) often act in
a complementary fashion to yield a very uncomplimentary result.
Design defect and conduct are often symbiotic, not mutually incon-
sistent factors.
Based on its interpretation of the Erie mandate, the court deter-
mined that it was "not commissioned to take a position regard-
ing the advisability or fairness of the state court rule to be ap-
plied... ."31 This approach is juxtaposed against, and inconsistent
with, recognition that when anticipating a state's highest court
ruling a "delicate balancing of policy considerations" 32 is involved.
Through its reliance upon the misguided duty not to be concerned
with the fairness or advisability of the anticipated rule (the duty
should be limited to application of existing law), the court took a
constrictive view of Anderson and other Ohio decisions. This ap-
proach forced the court to take a highly restrictive view of the Act
and to ignore the policy considerations which supported its enact-
ment. The policies which formed the foundation for the Act also
undergird an extension into the area of strict liability. In lieu of a
policy-oriented approach to the Act, the court relied on the non-
passage of a comprehensive product liability bill, 3 which included
30. A partial list of such decisions is set forth in Bailey, 770 F.2d 601, 606 n.3
(6th Cir. 1985). The list includes Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1979) in which the court extended the virtually identical statute of the Virgin Islands
to strict liability. The reasoning of this decision was not refuted or considered.
At least 28 jurisdictions have ruled on the issue of whether comparative principles
apply in strict liability actions. Twenty-two have answered in the affirmative. Ohio
is included in the minority group of rejecting states based on a court of common pleas
decision. See Note, Loosing the Shackles of "No-Fault" in Strict Liability: A Better
Approach to Comparative Fault, 33 Ct..v. ST. L. REV. 339, 343 n.15 (1984-85).
31. Bailey, 770 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1985).
32. Id. at 604 n.1.
33. Id. at 605 referring to H.B. No. 779, 114th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess.
(1981-82). For a variety of reasons, the Ohio General Assembly has failed to enact a
[Vol. 17
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as one of its many provisions a section expanding contributory
negligence to strict liability actions, as evidence that judicial
extension was improper.
Recognizing the weight to be given the district court ("[wihere
state law is unclear court of appeals should not reverse if district
judge reached permissible conclusion"),34 the court was largely able
to support the district court decision in Bailey. This principle was
not applied to the district court opinion in Stearns because that
decision was critically viewed as "in contravention of the express
statutory language, giving no weight to the Supreme Court's
distinction of the two theories, or the Common Pleas decision
contrary."35 The degree of persuasiveness of a single common pleas
decision is minimal and should play no significant role in an Erie
determination. Such a decision lacks precedential effect. That the
court utilized such a basis for its cavalier treatment of the Stearns
opinion is not characteristic.
In reaching its conclusion, the court committed several errors.
First: As the court observed, a delicate balancing of policy was
needed. The opinion is essentially devoid of any such balancing
effort. This duty was largely abdicated by the very court which
carefully recognized it. Rather, the court inartfully avoided such a
delicate task by determining that fairness and appropriateness were
not relevant.
Second: The court ignored the Wilfong v. Batdorf 6 decision. The
opinion does not even cite this important Ohio Supreme Court
decision which established a form of common law comparative
negligence consistent with the Comparative Negligence Act. The
Ohio Supreme Court has recognized the important policy consider-
ations which support the principles of comparative negligence. The
Sixth Circuit did not consider these policy considerations, did not
consider Wilfong, did not consider the effect of Wilfong on prior
decisions, and totally failed to recognize the interrelationship be-
tween the Anderson and Wilfong cases. For these reasons the court
lost an opportunity to develop a common law of comparative
negligence consistent with the Act.
comprehensive product liability act. That the comparative fault component of such a
comprehensive bill has failed is as readily attributable to the overall effects of the bill
as to this particular provision.
34. Id. at 607.
35. Id. at 607 n.4.
36. 6 Ohio St. 3d 100, 451 N.E.2d 1145 (1983).
Spring 1986]
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Third: The court failed to recognize that contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk are creatures of the common law subject
to judicial modification. A number of the jurisdictions cited by the
court adopted comparative negligence as a common law concept in
the absence of statute or chose to extend statutory comparative
negligence through development of parallel common law. Nothing
in the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act specifically proscribes such
a common law parallel development. The Ohio General Assembly
has not acted to overrule this approach in the time since Wilfong
was reported. In essence, the court surrendered its common law
rights to the Ohio General Assembly.37
Fourth: The court failed to rectify the potential conflict wherein a
jury can find for plaintiff on both a theory of negligence and a theory
of strict liability. Should such findings be made, a jury would be
hard pressed to ascertain the proper amount of damages. Moreover,
the jury determination and intent to find that the plaintiff was
partially responsible for his injury would be totally preempted if the
full award was upheld under the strict liability jury instruction.
A manufacturing defect in a vacuum causes no harm. When that
defect causes harm, in and of itself, an injured consumer should
recover fully. This the court has allowed. When that same defect
causes harm only because of the intervention of the injured plaintiff,
whose conduct was inappropriate, that plaintiff is entitled to recover
only to the extent of harm caused by the defect. This the court failed
to recognize. The decision reached by Judge Thomas in Stearns has
the support of the overwhelming weight of decisional law and most
commentators. His analysis of the logical next step for the Ohio
Supreme Court is as valid as any contrary conclusion. Judge Thomas'
decision was both "permissible" and "tenable" and should have been
affirmed.38 This author has not had the privilege of reviewing the
written opinion, if any, of the district court in Bailey. If it was as
well reasoned and articulate as that of the district court in Stearns
then, perhaps, the Sixth Circuit ruled correctly. In such a situation
only one of the district court judges could be upheld. On the evidence
available, it appears that caution prevailed over logic, reason, and
37. A similar result occurred when the Sixth Circuit refused to limit the
imposition of multiple punitive damages by indicating that any such limitation
should be legislatively established. This result was reached even though the principle
of punitive damages is, and always has been, a creature of the common law. See
Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (1982).
38. Bailey, 770 F.2d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1985).
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policy. This is an untenable result for a court as qualified, compe-
tent, and erudite as the Sixth Circuit.
III. THE MICHIGAN LAw-FRESEEABILITY DECISIONS
In both Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.3 9 and Toth v. Yoder Co., 4 0
the court had ample state law upon which to base its decisions. The
common question concerned the interpretation and application of
the foreseeability element to specific facts. In Rhea, the result is
fully supported on both the facts and law. However, in Toth, the
court may have gone beyond a proper application as noted in the
strenuous dissent.41 If Toth is correctly reasoned and resolved, the
substantive law of Michigan varies significantly from that of other
jurisdictions including a sister state in the Sixth Circuit.42
In Rhea, the plaintiff obtained ajury verdict for injuries sustained
when he inadvertently shifted a Massey-Ferguson tractor into gear
while standing next to it. The tractor moved forward and rolled over
the plaintiff causing severe injury. This movement occurred despite
the fact that the clutch was not engaged. Liability was predicated
upon claims of negligence and breach of warranty. The jury found
plaintiff partially liable under the applicable comparative negli-
gence statute and reduced the judgment accordingly. Defendant's
motion for judgment n.o.v. was denied by the district court and this
decision was affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit in Rhea had no difficulty with determining that
jury issues were raised as to both negligence and breach of war-
ranty. Whether viewed from the perspective of negligence and
"foreseeable risk,"43 or the perspective of breach of warranty and
"foreseeable uses,"44 a jury could determine that activation of the
39. 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
40. 749 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1984).
41. 749 F.2d 1190, 1198-99 (6th Cir. 1984) (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
42. Contrary to the result arguably called for by Michigan law, the Ohio Supreme
Court has made clear that employer modification which is the direct cause of injury
insulates the manufacturer-designer from liability and provides a basis for summary
judgment. King K.R. Wilson Co., 8 Ohio St. 3d 9, 455 N.E.2d 1282 (1983); Temple v.
Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
43. Rhea, 767 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1985), relying on Byrnes v. Economic Mach.
Co., 41 Mich. App. 192, 201, 200 N.W.2d 104, 108 (1972).
44. Rhea, 767 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1985), relying on Fredericks v. General
Motors Corp., 411 Mich. 712, 720, 311 N.W.2d 725, 728 (1981).
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tractor was possible, without intent, due to the design of the clutch
and transmission. Similar allegations against other manufacturers,
involving substantial numbers of vehicles, have been made (e.g.,
claims that a shift lever moves out of "park" into gear). Although
the quality of evidence presented by plaintiff was not detailed, it
appears that defendant's "failure to incorporate a mechanism to
prevent inadvertent movement of the 'hi-lo' shift lever rendered the
tractor unsafe for its foreseeable uses." 45 As mechanisms to avoid
inadvertent slippage of shift levers are available, it was reasonable
for a jury to conclude that such a device should have been incorpo-
rated into the design. Allowing this issue to reach the jury was
consistent with Michigan law and numerous decisions elsewhere.
A far more serious question concerning the scope of foreseeability
and its relationship to liability is found in Toth. Here the district
court entered judgment n.o.v. in favor of defendant, Yoder Com-
pany. The standard of review played an important role in the
decision of the Sixth Circuit which reversed and reinstated the jury
verdict. Defendant manufactured the subject cold roll-forming ma-
chine and sold it to plaintiffs employer in 1958. When sold it had an
on/off switch only at the entry end and the machine could be
"jogged" by use of a clutch bar that ran the length of the machine.
Prior to the date of injury (1977), the employer made a number of
modifications to the machine including the addition of toggle type
on/off switches at either end and the addition of "jog" buttons along
the front. When plaintiff learned that the product being rolled was
creased, he shut down the machine and began to realign the spacers.
The evidence did not clearly establish what caused the machine to
jog and cause the injury, but the court candidly admitted that: "it
appears that he brushed against one of the jog buttons along the
front of the machine .. .. *"46 The machine was not equipped with
point of operation guards which could have prevented the injury. It
is fairly clear that the machine was not inadvertently put into the
"on" position thereby requiring a determination that the jog button
added by the employer was the sole device responsible for the
activation which caused the injury. The district court therefore
granted judgment n.o.v. on the grounds that, as sold, the machine
could not have caused the harm. (Plaintiff, at the front of the
machine, could not have activated the side clutch jogging mecha-
45. 767 F.2d at 269.
46. 749 F.2d 1190, 1192 (6th Cir. 1984).
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nism.) Under Michigan law, the defective design issue had to be
decided, as in Rhea, on theories of negligence and breach of
warranty.
Defendant admitted that a barrier guard was available in 1957
and would have prevented the injury. This raised the question of
whether plaintiff had to establish that the design was the sole factor
causing injury or merely a proximate cause of injury. This specific
question was not satisfactorily resolved by the court. However, it is
common to impose liability where more than one factor contributed
to the injury causing event provided that the injury could have
occurred in the absence of the other factors. The court ignored this
recognized limitation.
Again, as in Rhea, the court applied proper Michigan law. Here,
however, it did so by asserting that:
There was evidence from which the jury could have found that the
addition of jog buttons was probable and foreseeable. As originally
supplied, the machine was jogged by use of the clutch bar, and in
starting it slowly and gradually it was necessary to slip the clutch.
Slipping the clutch would cause wear and eventually necessitate its
replacement. Defendant had itself sold machines equipped with jog
buttons, and its current model is equipped with a cord and a button for
that purpose. A jury could have reasonably concluded that the addition
of electrical jog buttons, which would not have the wear characteristics
of the mechanical clutch, was a foreseeable alteration of the machine. 47
The basis for this argument appears to be an improper application
of the facts to the law resting largely on the court's analogy to
Byrnes v. Economic Machinery Co.48 In Byrnes, the operator of the
subject machine had turned it off so that he could safely adjust the
brakes. Another employee inadvertently activated the machine
resulting in the injuries. The Michigan appellate court correctly
found that this was a foreseeable circumstance.
The Sixth Circuit, in Toth, failed to distinguish between the
foreseeable negligence of a fellow employee and the intentional
intervention of an employer who modified the machine in a manner
which increased the danger to the user. A simple negligent act of a
fellow employee cannot be equated with the intentional act of an
employer. Even if some modification was foreseeable, the act of the
47. Id. at 1196.
48. 41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d 104 (1972). 749 F.2d at 1195-96 n.3.
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employer, coupled with the plaintiffs own action, caused the harm
to Toth. The degree of foreseeability reached unreasonable propor-
tions. The duty to protect against foreseeable risk, as observed by
the court, extends as a qualified duty, i.e., the risk must be
reasonably foreseeable. The Toth majority did not give effect to this
limitation. As there was no Michigan law directly on point, the court
could have looked to the analogous cases in Ohio. 49 Although such
cases would not have been binding, their application of the foresee-
ability concept, as it related to manufacturer design decisions and
employer modification, would have compelled a different result. The
"liberal" or "consumer oriented" approach of the Ohio Supreme
Court is well known. Nevertheless, this court denies recovery where
the modification was the cause of the injury.
The dissenting opinion in Toth argues that the majority decision
imposes absolute liability or vicarious liability (due to the negli-
gence of the third party employer). Whether absolute liability was
imposed is a question of degree. It is evident that something very
close to absolute liability was imposed even if Justice Krupansky's
description is debatable. The dissent observed that the majority
itself recognized that without the addition of the jog buttons the
injury could not have occurred. The injury was the result of the
modification and the plaintiffs own negligence. Relying largely on
the same cases as the majority, and certainly on the same legal
principles, the dissent reaches an inapposite conclusion, in part
because:
[s]tated differently, the danger presented by the machine was clearly
not a result of defective design, but rather a result of the negligence of
plaintiffs employer in making major modifications to the machine
without regard for the hazardous consequences to employees. Thus, the
majority vicariously imposed the employer's negligence on the defen-
dant in this case, an approach which has been expressly rejected in this
circuit.50
The expansive application of the foreseeability standard utilized
by the majority virtually equates foreseeability with liability. The
courts have assiduously refrained from establishing such a basis for
imposition of liability. To do otherwise would be to impose absolute
49. King, 8 Ohio St. 3d 9, 455 N.E.2d 1282 (1983); Temple, 50 Ohio St. 2d 317,364
N.E.2d 267 (1977).
50. 749 F.2d at 1198 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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liability. With benefit of hindsight, any injury causing event or
design is foreseeable. In the Toth case, the defendant manufacturer
could not have prevented the modification regardless of any instruc-
tions or warnings it could have theoretically provided. Had a barrier
guard been incorporated into the design, nothing would have
prevented the employer from removing it if this suited his economic
convenience. 51 Assuming that the manufacturer could reasonably
foresee the actual modification, he could not equally foresee that it
would be made without regard to the additional danger it created or
that the employer would not, at the same time, retrofit the machine
with an available point of operation guard. The defendant could
have readily foreseen removal of any safety device it did provide. In
essence, the employer defeated the existing safety design feature
which permitted jogging only while depressing a clutch bar at the
side of the machine.
Not only did the court engage in speculation and permit the jury
to engage in speculation as to what was foreseeable, it did so only
with regard to the foreseeability of the jog button addition. The
equally foreseeable potential for addition of a proper safety device
subsequent to, or simultaneously with, the addition of the jog
buttons was ignored as was the equally foreseeable potential for
defeating any safety device. On the reasoning of the court, liability
would have been imposed if the employer had (a) added a jog button
and (b) removed a barrier guard. This combination of actions is as
readily foreseeable as either alone. Such a possibility for the
imposition of liability must not be tolerated as it mandates that
every manufacturer be the insurer of the safety of its design. This
potential exists regardless of the age of the product at the time of
injury (nineteen years in Toth), the date of modification, or the date
when a retrofit could have been made.
On the reasoning of the court, a jury issue would be created if a
terrorist action succeeded even though it was novel and could not
have been prevented by the use of reasonable care. The very
foreseeability of a terrorist bombing would be sufficient to raise a
jury issue and support imposition of damages. The broad language of
the foreseeability rule under Michigan law requires a reviewing
court to interpret that law and its application to specific facts. It is
highly unlikely that a Michigan court would uphold liability for a
terrorist act or travel this road to protect an injured user from harm
51. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
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caused by the intentional act of his employer, with a direct effect
upon the product design, and the user's negligence. Foreseeability
under Michigan law does not compel the abolition of intervening
cause as a defense nor eliminate the basic causation requirement.
The Toth majority seems to believe that it does.
IV. A SAMPLER OF OTHER DECISIONS
Brief discussion of an additional decision involving application of
Ohio law and decisions applying Kentucky and Tennessee law,
respectively, will complete this overview of the Sixth Circuit's
approach to product liability law. In Birchfield v. International
Harvester Co.,52 a further example of the difficulty presented in
application of the law to specific facts, together with some question
of whether the correct law was applied, will be presented. More
perceptive and accurate determinations of the law and its applica-
tion to the facts are seen in Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co. 53 and
Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.54
In Birchfield, a plaintiffs decedent sustained crushing injuries
when he attempted to remove compacted fertilizer from a bin
without first loosening the fertilizer by blasting. When the effort
was made, the battle of Jericho was reenacted. The wall came
tumbling down. Plaintiff was struck by a considerable amount of
compacted fertilizer. The front-end loader which he was operating
was not equipped with an overhead guard or shield. The absence of
the shield was viewed as a design defect to justify a new trial after
the district court had directed a verdict in favor of the manufacturer.
The Sixth Circuit correctly observed that the district court erred by
failing to recognize that the doctrine of strict liability was applicable
to design defect claims under Ohio law. The court failed to recognize
that even under strict liability the directed verdict was correct due
to the particular factual circumstances. A strenuous dissent focused
on a number of flaws in the majority reasoning.55
52. 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984) (Ohio law).
53. 738 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1984) (Kentucky law).
54. 756 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1984) (Tennessee law).
55. 726 F.2d at 1137-38 (Weick, J., dissenting). The flaws observed included: (1)
the manufacturer provided such guards as optional equipment which the purchaser
(plaintiffs employer) did not order; (2) the guards could not be used on all front-end
loaders as these machines are often used in cramped areas or in areas where
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In essence, the court failed to recognize that even if the case was
viewed from the perspective of strict liability, the defendant man-
ufacturer had no duty to provide an overhead guard. As far as
defendant was aware, such a guard could have rendered its product
unfit for the purposes intended. It was the purchaser-employer who
had the duty to obtain equipment which could safely perform the
functions of the business. As in Toth, the court appears to have
imposed a form of vicarious liability based upon the misconduct of
the employer. Not only did the employer fail to purchase and provide
the available guard, the employer was aware of the condition of the
fertilizer and encouraged plaintiff to get one load before blasting.
The true cause of plaintiffs injury was a result of the employer's
actions and inactions.
The law applied was correct insofar as it was stated. The case,
however, mandated that additional legal concepts be considered.
The plaintiff asserted that the cause of death was the failure to
provide a guard. The claim presented an issue of enhanced injury
identical to the issue raised in crashworthiness cases, i.e., that the
front-end loader did not prevent or reduce what may have been an
avoidable injury. Just as in a crashworthiness case, no defect in the
front-end loader caused the accident. The injury claim was directed
solely to the unit's failure to prevent injury after an accident
sequence was initiated. This is identical to a claim for enhanced
injury arising from crashworthiness. In such a case, it is incumbent
upon the plaintiff to prove the degree of enhanced injury.56 No such
evidence was provided. Without this evidence plaintiff failed to
establish a prima facie case regardless of whether the action was
predicated on negligence, warranty or strict liability. For this
reason alone, without regard to any other factor noted in the dissent,
the directed verdict should have been affirmed.
obstructions are present; (3) defendant was not advised of the use to which its
front-end loader would be put; (4) the only relevant standard, an ANSI specification,
provided that guards should be installed unless, as in this case, otherwise ordered by
the purchaser; (5) there was no evidence to establish that an overhead guard would
have prevented this injury or reduced its extent; and (6) as in Orfield v. International
Harvester, Inc., 535 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1976) the expert testimony was not determi-
native. Id.
56. This burden of proof was established in the seminal negligence based
decision, Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). It was applied
and met by the use of expert testimony in the strict liability based case of Leichtamer
v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981). The majority
relied on Leichtamer but ignored this ramification.
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The setting aside of a jury verdict, upon motion for judgment
n.o.v., was upheld in Calhoun. The plaintiff, operating a Honda
motorcycle, rear-ended a tractor-trailer truck. As a result of the
injuries sustained, plaintiff had no recall of the facts leading to this
unwitnessed accident. The complaint alleged that a design defect in
the brakes caused poor braking performance when wet conditions
prevailed. Plaintiff relied upon a recall letter stating that rear brake
pad efficiency was reduced by heavy rain conditions. It had not
rained on the day of the accident, but the motorcycle had been
through a carwash approximately thirty minutes prior to the
accident. 57 There was conflicting expert testimony as to the exis-
tence of a defect.
The court recognized that under the circumstances and evidence
adduced the recall letter was inadmissible. 58 The affirmance was
based on the absence of any proof of causation rather than an
inadequate proof of defect. (The evidence relating to the existence of
defect merited jury considerations had this been the sole element
needed to establish a prima facie case.) The court was able to affirm
the district court on the causation issue alone, i.e., that the evidence
did not adequately relate the brake defect to the plaintiffs loss of
motorcycle control. 59 That the court was able to perceive the need for
proving causation as well as defect is to be commended. Here the
court carefully reviewed the facts, and the omissions of factual
evidence, to uphold a defense judgment after a jury determination in
favor of a seriously injured young plaintiff. It is interesting to note
that the panel included Judges Weick and Krupansky. The case may
illustrate the vagaries of panel selection. Had the same panel
decided either Birchfield or Toth, the result in either or both may
well have been different.
The ability to focus on the totality of legal issues and facts is also
illustrated in Bright. Here a jury verdict in favor of the defendant
was upheld in an action brought by the fathers or representatives of
three young men who had died as a result of an automobile accident.
Plaintiffs alleged that the accident was caused by tread separation
57. The court established that the broad fact of exposure to water in the carwash
did not provide adequate specifics to show that the brake pad was wet at the time of
the accident. 738 F.2d at 132.
58. Id. at 133. See Werber, Automobile Recall Campaigns: Proposals for Admin-
istrative and Judicial Responses, 56 U. DEW. J. URB. L. 1083 (1979).
59. 738 F.2d at 133. Correctly relying, in part, on Midwestern V.W. v. Ringley,
503 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1973).
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of a tire manufactured by the defendant. There was sufficient
evidence to justify a jury question on the issue of defect in the tire.60
A significant issue arose, in part from pre-trial maneuvering by
counsel for plaintiff, with regard to whether the claim sounding in
negligence would be reinstated for trial. Plaintiff finally decided to
do so and proceeded on grounds of strict liability and negligence.
The hesitancy was caused by evidence that the plaintiffs decedent
driver was intoxicated and the question of the admissibility of such
evidence if the case was limited to strict liability. The court rejected
plaintiffs contention that the negligence claim was presented to the
jury only because the district court had made clear that the
intoxication evidence would be admitted regardless of whether this
claim was presented at trial. (The contention that plaintiffs were
thereby forced to include the negligence basis was refuted and
described as "disingenuous," as plaintiffs only route to recovery of
the punitive damages sought was through a negligence claim.)61
The key to the admission of the intoxication evidence was not its
role as contributory negligence. Rather, the intoxication was prop-
erly viewed by both the district court and the Sixth Circuit, as a
causation factor:
The District Court did not even refer to contributory negligence. The
Court merely indicated that the evidence would be admitted if found
relevant to any of the issues in the case. Evidence that the car's driver
was intoxicated could be relevant to the issue of causation, which is an
element of a strict liability cause of action.62
For this reason the intoxication evidence was admissible regardless
of the underlying legal theory asserted.
60. A considerable portion of the decision was directed to the admissibility of
documentary evidence and testimony arising from a National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration hearing. 756 F.2d 19, 21-23 (6th Cir. 1984). This issue was resolved
through application of the Federal Rules of Evidence and is beyond the scope of this
article.
61. 756 F.2d 19, 21 (6th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. (citations omitted).
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V. CONCLUSION
It appears that the Sixth Circuit is often as willing to take a
realistic view of evidence relating to the need to establish causation
as it is to the effect of foreseeability. With proper focus on causation,
the extension of foreseeability into liability can be avoided. Sound
application of the causation concept would also lead to a proper
application of comparative negligence or comparative fault princi-
ples.63 Perhaps it is only the personal views of the author that led to
criticism (herein) of Bailey, Birchfield, and Toth, and to praise for
Bright, Calhoun, and Rhea. Nevertheless, there is some tendency to
focus on either foreseeability or causation aspects in a given case
rather than upon the interaction of these two key elements.
On balance, the Sixth Circuit cannot, as it should not, be catego-
rized as pro or con either party. No discernible trend suggests the
sobriquet of a plaintiff or defendant oriented court. That plaintiffs
have prevailed more often than defendants is largely a result of the
state law applied and the facts of the given case. The opinions
illustrate the court's willingness to ascertain and apply the most
recent relevant law to a given case. That this author disagrees with
some factual applications of the law or with some determination of
the law, in no way diminishes the careful analysis performed by the
court. Those who practice in the Sixth Circuit, and argue before this
court, are fortunate. Win or lose, each counsel can be confident that
his position will receive a fair hearing and that the court will act
solely on its analysis of the law and its understanding of the facts.
Lucid appellate briefs and persuasive oral argument will enable the
court to reach sound decisions. The burden of advocacy remains on
counsel.
63. A key to comparative principles is, of course, causation. This was not truly
considered in Bailey. Strict liability is often referred to as a form of breach of
warranty action minus a variety of technical obstacles. The Uniform Commercial
Code recognizes that a breach of warranty may be defeated by the conduct of the
purchaser. See U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 13 (1972). As illustrated by Rhea and Toth,
no real problem seems to exist with application of comparative principles to a
warranty action when there is also a negligence action.
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